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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MODESTO DIVISION

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In re	Case No. 07-90112-A-13G
CHRISTOPHER BONORA,) Docket Control No. IAM-1
Debtor.) Date: May 14, 2007) Time: 2:00 p.m.)

On May 14, 2007 at 2:00 p.m., the court considered the chapter 13 debtor's motion to determine the secured status of several creditors all secured by a single parcel of real property. If the court determined that the collateral of these creditors was worthless, the motion also requested that the court avoid the liens of these creditors. The court's ruling on the motion is appended to the minutes of the hearing. Because that ruling constitutes a "reasoned explanation" of the court's decision, it is also posted on the court's Internet site, www.caeb.uscourts.gov, in a text-searchable format as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. The official record, however, remains the ruling appended to the minutes of the hearing.

FINAL RULING

The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

The motion requests that the subject real property be valued. This relief may be requested in a motion. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Rule 3012 motions may be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount

and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

The court can also allow claims as secured or unsecured based on the value of the property evaluated. Whether this is part of the valuation process under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) or is in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. See also In re State Line Hotel, Inc., 323 B.R. 703, 713 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a claim objection is not governed by the service of process rules applicable in adversary proceedings).

However, to the extent a chapter 13 debtor when making a valuation motion also requests other relief, such as declaratory relief regarding the extent, validity, or priority of the respondents' liens, or an order avoiding those liens on grounds other than 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the motion must be denied without prejudice because such relief requires an adversary proceeding. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001.

Whether the relief requested in this motion may be sought in a contested matter or must be demanded in an adversary proceeding, no relief may be granted in this case at this time. According to the certificates of service, many of the respondents holding liens on the subject property were not properly served.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9013(a) provides that relief in a contested matter must be requested in a motion. That motion must be served in the "manner provided for service of a summons and a complaint by Rule 7004." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9013(b). When service is by mail, as it was in this case, Fed. R. Bankr. P.

7004(b)(3) requires that service on corporate and partnership respondents be "to the attention of an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process...." When service by mail is directed to a state or municipal corporation, process must be directed "to the person or office upon whom process is prescribed to be served by [state] law ... or in the absence of the designation of any such person or office by state law, then to the chief executive officer thereof." See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(6).

A review of the certificates reveals that service on the nonfederal government agencies was not directed to an executive officer. And, none of the entities, Northern California Collection Service, Everest National Insurance Company, Financial Pacific Leasing, and Race Street Foods, were served in the care of their agent for service of process or other authorized agent.

Also, Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1(c) provides that notices in adversary proceedings and contested matters that are served on the IRS shall be mailed to three entities at three different addresses: (1) IRS, P.O. Box 21126, Philadelphia, PA 19114; (2) United States Attorney, for the IRS, 501 I Street, Suite 10-100, Sacramento, CA 95814 [if the case is pending in the Sacramento Division] or United States Attorney, for the IRS, 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401, Fresno, CA 93721-1318 [if the case is pending in the Modesto or Fresno Divisions]; and (3) United States Department of Justice, Civil Trial Section, Western Region, Box 683, Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044.

According to the debtor, the subject property in Stanislaus

County has a value of \$168,000 and it is encumbered by a first priority consensual lien held by Litton Loan Servicing and securing a claim of \$98,178.70.

Also according to the debtor, in second and third priority positions are two tax liens recorded in Stanislaus County on October 25, 2002 and held by the IRS securing tax claims of \$8,486.53 and \$54,679.03. These two tax debts total \$63,165.56.

However, the proof of claim filed by the IRS demands \$61,181 as its secured claim. Further, its proof of claim reveals that a total of \$40,678.86 of the \$61,181 in taxes, interest, and penalties is not secured by the tax liens recorded on October 25, 2002 but by later recorded liens. This discrepancy is not surprising given that the only evidence of the tax liens with the motion is a title report. A title report gives information regarding documents recorded against a specific property. When a lien is reported, the amount secured by the lien is the amount initially reported, not the balance due as of the date of the title report.

Parenthetically, if the title report is an accurate recitation of the amounts due each lien holder, the total amount due to these respondents, not counting amounts owed to Litton and to the IRS on its October 25, 2002 liens, exceeds the maximum amount of unsecured debt a chapter 13 debtor may have under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). See United States v. Edmonston (In re Edmonston), 99 B.R. 995, 999 (E.D. Cal. 1989).

Therefore, even if service and process were correct, on this record, the court would be unable to determine whether the taxes secured by the two October 25, 2002 IRS tax liens are fully or

only partially secured. Nor would the court be able to make any informed judgment regarding the current amounts secured by any of the other junior liens. Because of this, neither could the court determine which of the liens recorded by other respondents after October 25, 2002 are supported by any equity.

Additionally, if the court were in a position to value the property and determine the amount of each respondent's secured claim, the court would not, at this time, also avoid any respondent's lien or security interest. Their liens must remain of record until the plan is completed and the debtor is discharged, or their claims are paid in full per the terms of any agreement and/or applicable nonbankruptcy law. Once the discharge is entered, or an obligation is satisfied under applicable nonbankruptcy law, if a respondent will not reconvey its lien, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding to void that lien. See Cal. Civil Code § 2941(d).

There are three reasons why it would be premature to avoid a respondent's lien in connection with a valuation motion.

First, a secured creditor is entitled to retain its lien until the earlier of the date its claim is paid in full as determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law or the date the debtor receives a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i). Neither has occurred in this case.

Second, if the court now avoided a lien and permitted the debtor to sell or encumber the real property encumbered by that lien, but the case was later dismissed without the lien holder being paid in full per the terms of its obligation or applicable nonbankruptcy law or without the discharge being entered, the

court would be unable to restore the respondent's lien as required by 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(C).

Third, a court of the United States is permitted to resolve "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Constitution, Art. III, § 2.

This requirement means that "there must be a tangible dispute that is capable of resolution in a manner that will have a concrete impact on the parties to the dispute" before a federal court may act. 15 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 101.01, p. 101-13 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). The existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. S. Jackson & Son Inc., v. Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exch., Inc., 24 F.3d 427, 431 (2nd Cir. 1994); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1990).

The doctrine of ripeness is one of the doctrines used by federal courts to determine whether a case or controversy is justiciable. Whether or not a case and controversy is ripe for adjudication is a question of timing. Anderson v. Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059 (1995). Has the dispute been brought at a point so early that it is not clear whether a real dispute exists between the parties? The ripeness doctrine, therefore, prevents federal courts from becoming entangled in purely abstract, hypothetical, or theoretical disagreements. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967).

Any dispute regarding the avoidability of a respondent's lien is both premature and hypothetical until the debtor completes the chapter 13 plan and obtains a discharge. Once this occurs, the debtor can demand that the respondent reconvey its

lien. If the demand is refused, a case and controversy will have ripened into an actual dispute that can be resolved by this court.

At this time, the debtor has not been discharged and none of the respondents have been paid in full under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since the absence of a ripe controversy implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court may raise the issue *sua sponte*. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Los Angeles, 922 F.2d at 502.